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This paper focuses on the social function of painful experience as
revealed by recent studies on social decision-making. Observing others
suffering from physical pain evokes empathic reactions that can lead
to prosocial behavior (e.g., helping others at a cost to oneself), which
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might be regarded as the social value of pain derived from evolution.
Feelings of guilt may also be elicited when one takes responsibility for
another’s pain. These social emotions play a significant role in various
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cognitive processes and may affect behavioral preferences. In addition,
the influence of others’ pain on decision-making is highly sensitive to
social context. Combining neuroimaging techniques with a novel decision
paradigm, we found that when asking participants to trade-off personal
benefits against providing help to other people, verbally describing the
causal relationship between their decision and other people’s pain (i.e.,
framing) significantly changed participants’ preferences. This social
framing effect was associated with neural activation in the temporoparietal
junction (TPJ), which is a brain area that is important in social cognition
and in social emotions. Further, transcranial direct current stimulation
(tDCS) on this region successfully modulated the magnitude of the social
framing effect. These findings add to the knowledge about the role of
perception of others’ pain in our social life.

1

Other people’s pain: the perspective of
social psychology

Pain is defined as a distressing experience
associated with actual or potential tissue damage,
involving sensory, emotional, cognitive, and social
components [1]. In both humans and animals,
painful experiences are manifested in altered facial

expressions, gestures, bodily reactions, vocal
activities, and behavioral patterns [2]. From an
evolutionary perspective, these pain signals are
important for survival as they demand attention
and express the need for healing and protection
[2]. The perception of pain signals that are
(unintentionally or intentionally) delivered by
another person (i.e., the perception of other
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people’s pain) is the main topic of this review,
which could be emotionally salient and socially
meaningful for observers.
Two theories, which focus on different aspects,
have described the subjective feelings and reactions
triggered by observing pain in others. The first
theory is the “empathizing hypothesis”, suggesting
that the observation of pain in others triggers
empathic reactions (see Section 2 for details).
The second theory is the “threat value of pain
hypothesis (TVPH)”, which suggests that the
threat-detection system could be activated by the
perception of pain in others [3]. To be specific,
observing pain in others indicates the existence
of a potential threat that may harm the observer
and thus requires vigilance. Consequently, the
threat-detection system is activated and generates
an aversive response in the observer. Although
the TVPH is relatively new, this hypothesis has
received support from recent studies [4, 5].
While the two theories are not necessarily
conflicting, this review is mainly interested in
the prosocial function of pain indicated by the
empathizing hypothesis. Below, we discuss how
the perception of pain in others motivates and
regulates prosocial actions (e.g., helping), whether and how these effects are driven by social
emotions such as empathy and guilt, and how the
relationship between social emotion and prosocial
behavior manifests in social decision-making
paradigms (especially social framing tasks).
Exploring these questions can help to explain the
basis of successful social interactions [6].

2

Social emotions related to other people’s
pain

2.1 Empathy
Pain in others is a salient negative stimulus and
can significantly affect the feelings and thoughts
of observers [7]. At the neural level, the expression

of pain in others activates the so-called “pain
matrix” (i.e., the pain-related network: a set of
brain regions associated with directly experienced
pain) including the anterior insula (AI), the
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), the amygdala,
the somatosensory cortex, and supplementary
motor areas [7–10]. This phenomenon indicates
that when witnessing others in pain, the observer
also experiences pain to some extent [11]. In
line with this idea, event-related potential (ERP)
research has demonstrated larger amplitudes of
the ERP components N1, N2, P3, and late positive
potential (LPP) in response to painful, rather than
neutral, stimuli [3, 12–15].
Observing others in a painful condition may
elicit empathic emotions. Empathy refers to the
capacity to vicariously share the affective states
of others and adopt their point of view, which is
a hallmark of psychological maturity that allows
people to understand how others are emotionally
affected by a given event [16–18]. The PerceptionAction Model (PAM) proposed by Preston and de
Waal suggests that empathic feelings automatically
occur [19]. However, this viewpoint contradicts
previous findings that empathic responses are
restricted by cognitive resources such as working
memory load [20]. Brain-imaging [e.g., functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)] studies have
shown that there are two components of empathy
subserved by distinct brain networks, that is, a
bottom-up affective resonance (associated with
the mirror neuron system and the limbic system)
and a top-down cognitively controlled process
(associated with prefrontal cortical circuitries)
[7, 21–23]. Correspondingly, ERP experiments
have revealed two temporal stages during the
processing of painful stimuli (compared with
non-painful ones), including an early, automatic
stage of emotional contagion and affective sharing
(indexed by the N1 and N2 components) and
a late, higher-level stage that controls empathic
responses and creates a self–other distinction
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(indexed by the P3 and LPP) [24–26].
As pointed out by Singer et al., the ability to
experience other people’s pain is a core feature
of empathy [27]. Pain empathy is grounded in
people’s first-hand experiences of pain, given
that the perceptions of one’s own pain and
another’s pain are subserved by overlapping
neurocomputational functions [28–30] and that
they can be similarly modulated by psychological
and pharmacological factors (e.g., placebos) [30,
31]. Physical painkillers (e.g., acetaminophen)
reduce empathy for others’ pain via the same
neural pathways that alleviate one’s own pain
[32]. It should be noted that empathy for pain
does not involve the entire “pain matrix” [27].
Key regions of the affective component of pain
empathy include the AI, ACC, temporoparietal
junction (TPJ), and inferior frontal gyrus, while
those of the cognitive component include the
inferior parietal lobule and mid-cingulate cortex
(MCC), according to some recent meta-analyses
on brain-imaging evidence [33, 34].
Contextual information about the imminence
of a painful event (e.g., visual or verbal cues) may
greatly influence one’s own sensations of pain
[35–37]. Likewise, empathy for pain in others is
flexible and can be modulated by social context
(i.e., the immediate social setting where the
ongoing event happens) [38]. To take an example,
when participants were exposed to video clips
featuring an age-matched individual experiencing
pain, their explicit rating for that pain was
significantly lower when the pain-taker was
responsible for his/her condition (e.g., infected
with AIDS resulting from intravenous drug use)
compared with when he/she was not responsible
(e.g., infected with AIDS resulting from an infected
blood transfusion) [39]. According to the literature,
other social factors that are known to affect the
perception and/or cognitive appraisal of others’
pain include: racial background [26, 40, 41], group
membership [42–44], social reputation [45], and
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social hierarchy [46] of the pain-taker; the social
relationship between the observer and the paintaker [4]; whether the pain is accidental or is
intentionally inflicted by the observer or by another
person [47, 48]; and whether the pain is associated
with a reward for oneself [49].
In humans, facial expressions might be the
most unambiguous and powerful way to deliver
pain signals. Nevertheless, the use of facial stimuli
is not required to induce empathy for pain in
the laboratory; instead, the understanding that
other people are in pain could be inferred from
various nonfacial cues. To take an extreme
example, a piece of slashed paper (as an artistic
gesture) invites a sense of empathic movement,
which might be based on imagination, inference,
and perspective-taking [50]. To our knowledge,
the most frequently used visual stimuli to date are
static pictures showing the painful consequences
of others’ actions, such as body–object (especially
hand–object) interactions. For instance, when
participants see that an individual is reaching out
his/her hand to touch the sharp end of a knife,
their empathic feelings might be elicited before
the contact actually happens. In previous studies,
the experimental effects of these pictures were
compared with those showing the non-painful
consequences of similar actions [12, 14, 24, 51].
According to some researchers, the processing
of a body–object interaction employs both action
representation and outcome expectation of this
interaction [52, 53]. More specifically, there are
three main stages in this processing: (a) differentiating different types of actions (e.g., approach vs.
withdrawal), (b) encoding the sensory and tactile
qualities of objects (e.g., noxious vs. neutral), and
(c) integrating the information generated from
the above two stages in a predictive manner to
represent the outcome of the ongoing interaction
(painful vs. non-painful) [54, 55]. Recent studies
have reinforced this theory from the perspective
of brain functions [56, 57].
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2.2 Guilt
Guilt is another important social emotion relevant
to the topic of this review. As a typical “moral
emotion”, guilt is defined as an emotional
experience associated with the belief (which may
or may not be true) that one is responsible for
violating a social norm or one’s own standard of
conduct [58]. Guilt is unpleasant but has positive
social consequences. People who feel guilty
are more likely to make amends to repair the
relationship between the transgressor and his/her
“victim” [59, 60]. The absence of guilt is a prominent feature of psychopathy, which leads
to antisocial behaviors [61]. Guilt could also
be classified as a “self-conscious emotion” that
features self-reflexive mental processes [62].
According to the classic attributional theory, the
activation and operation of guilt depend on the
outcome of self-evaluation processes; guilt emerges
when a negative social event is attributed to a
controllable aspect of the self (e.g., forgetting
to fulfill a promise) [63]. In contrast, recent
“adaptationist” theories focus on the interpersonal
rather than intrapersonal effects of self-conscious
emotions [64, 65]. According to this family of
theories, guilt increases one’s social value by
taking reparative actions, which would be beneficial
for individuals to solve adaptive problems in
the long run [66–68]. At the neural level, guilt
activates a wide range of elements in the social
brain network, including those engaged in selfreferential processing [e.g., the medial prefrontal
cortex (mPFC) and MCC] [69, 70] and theory of
mind (e.g., TPJ and the superior temporal sulcus)
[71, 72]. A recent fMRI study has shown that
compared with shame (another self-conscious
emotion associated with uncontrollable aspects
of the self), guilt activates brain regions linked
with theory of mind and emotion regulation
(e.g., the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) more
strongly [73].

Many previous studies have manipulated
guilt-like feelings by asking participants to recall
autobiographical memories or using script-driven
imagination [69, 72, 74–78]. In the laboratory,
guilty emotions can also be generated by perceptions of pain in others when the observer happens
to be the pain-causer. Not inflicting harm on others
is a universal moral principle. Thus, feelings
of interpersonal guilt emerge when people are
causally responsible for harming another individual. For example, when participants responded
incorrectly in a dot-estimation task designed by
Yu et al., a painful stimulation would befall their
partner (who was actually a confederate) [70]. In
this situation, the feeling of guilt involves otheroriented empathy for pain [79]. Correspondingly,
the guilt associated with others’ pain elicits both
the cognitive and affective components of the
empathy-related network including the TPJ, AI,
MCC, and ACC [48, 70, 80]. A recent study showed
that the MCC is also recruited in collective (or
group-based) guilt when another’s pain is not
caused by the participant, but by a third person
who is recognized as an in-group member with
the participant [81].
Interestingly, the perception of a painful situation
can be modulated by moral reasoning when one
assumes that other people are feeling guilty.
For example, participants rated the level of pain
intensity as significantly higher for depictions
featuring pain caused by another person compared
with self-inflicted ones caused by the protagonist
[82]. Further, enhanced hemodynamic activities
were found in the amygdala, right TPJ (rTPJ),
temporal pole, and posterior cingulate cortex when
painful images were described as intentionally
caused rather than accidentally caused by another
individual [47].
Other kinds of social emotions may be
occasionally related to the observation of others’
pain. For instance, an exaggerated expression of
pain may evoke feelings of embarrassment and
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contempt in the observer [83]. We consider this
kind of relationship to be less significant and thus
make no further elaboration in our review. In
the next section, we move on to discuss changes
in decision strategies among people who feel
empathy or guilt when perceiving (or imagining)
others in pain.

3

Pain and social decisions

A decision may be labeled as a “social decision”
when it involves a social component, such as
deciding about others (whether to marry someone),
for others (choosing a school for one’s children),
or jointly with others (cooperating with business
partners) [84]. Social decision scenarios can be
resolved in either an interactive or a unilateral
manner. According to classical economic literature
(e.g., expected utility theory), emotion plays a
negative role in decision-making as it interrupts
rational thinking [85]. In contrast, studies in the
past few decades have highlighted the significance
of emotion in both nonsocial and social decisions
[86]. Still, it is under debate in what way emotion
influences decision-making. Inspired by pioneers
such as Robert B. Zajonc, the “affect-as-information”
hypothesis indicates that momentary affective
states could serve informational functions in
judgment and choice [87, 88]. Further, Paul Slovic
points out that emotions act as important cues
to aid rational thinking, calling this mechanism
an “affect heuristic” [89–91]. Meanwhile, George
Loewenstein suggests that emotional feelings
can shape decision-making directly rather than
through modulating rational thinking and cognitive
evaluation (the “risk-as-feelings” hypothesis); he
also differentiates between “anticipated emotions”
(i.e., emotions that are expected to be encountered
in the future) and “anticipatory emotions” (i.e.,
emotions generated from the expected outcome)
[92]. The so-called anticipatory emotions are the
core of the “somatic marker hypothesis” proposed
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by Antonio Damasio, which states that previous
experience associated with an option affects somatic
responses (including heart rate, skin conductance,
and tonicity) when decision-makers are exposed
to the same option again, which could be regarded
as somatic markers (of the corresponding option)
that guide future decisions. Despite the discrepancies, these theories all belong to the broad
class of dual-process models that claim there are
two distinct processing modes: a fast, automatic,
emotional “system 1” and a more deliberate,
controlled, and analytic “system 2” [93–95].
However, dual-process models have been criticized
for their oversimplified nature [93, 96]. More
recently, Jennifer Lerner suggested that researchers
should distinguish between “integral emotions”
(those arising from the decision at hand; e.g.,
feeling anxious when playing poker) and
“incidental emotions” (those arising accidentally
at the time of the decision; e.g., feeling sad because
of the music being played in the casino); while
integral emotions are an essential part of the
decision process, incidental emotions might be
distracting [86].
It remains undetermined if a unified neural
mechanism underlies both social and nonsocial
decision-making. Many researchers believe that
regardless of whether a social component is
involved, different kinds of decision-making are
driven by identical neural value computations
and corresponding brain processes [84, 97–99].
For example, the ventral striatum (a key node
within the dopaminergic midbrain system) is
sensitive to both monetary reward and social
approval [100]. One of our recent studies supports
this “common neural currency” hypothesis, as a
meta-analysis of neuroimaging findings showed
that social and nonsocial reward processing
engage a common neural circuit consisting of
the ventral striatum, ventral tegmental area, and
AI [101]. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that social
decision-making also activates social-specific
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regions, including those responsible for social
perception, attribution, intention detection, theory
of mind, and social emotions such as empathy
[102].
As two important social emotions, the impact
of empathy and guilt on social decision-making
is evident in everyday life. The key function of
empathy in social interaction is bonding people
together. Empathy bolsters prosocial behaviors
(e.g., sharing, comforting, helping, and caring
for others) by facilitating our comprehension of
the affections, motivations, and behaviors of other
people [16]. Likewise, guilt promotes prosocial
behaviors (e.g., restitution, apologies, confessions,
and self-punishment) to benefit victims and
repair relationships [62, 73]. When making social
decisions, one of our main goals is to avoid
anticipated guilt [86]. It has been suggested that
guilt aversion is a driving force behind reciprocity
[103, 104].
In general, both empathy and guilt strengthen
adherence to social norms, which may result
from their relationship with morality. Morality
can be defined as a set of prescriptive norms about
how people should treat one another, including
concepts such as justice, fairness, and rights [17,
105]. Empathy can motivate people to behave in
accordance with moral principles [17], while guilt
indicates that one has violated a moral principle
and that it is necessary to remedy the situation.
On the other hand, an aversion to the suffering of

Fig. 1

others is unanimously acknowledged as a moral
obligation [106] and is a powerful motivator for
humans [107]. Taken together, when one observes
others in a painful situation and takes responsibility
for that situation, the feelings of empathy and
guilt being elicited (which should be categorized
as “integral emotions” according to Jennifer Lerner
[86]) can significantly affect moral judgment and
subsequent decisions about others’ pain (Fig. 1).
This mechanism explains why the perception of
pain in others motivates and regulates prosocial
helping behavior [2]. It would also be theoretically
interesting to examine whether empathy-related
and guilt-related brain regions are engaged in the
trade-off between increasing one’s benefits and
avoiding another’s pain (see Section 4.1).
Recent studies have demonstrated a positive
relationship between empathy for pain and
prosocial decisions to help others who are suffering
from pain [42, 43]. For instance, participants who
experienced enhanced empathy for pain (indexed
by self-reported measures and empathy-related
brain responses) were more likely to choose costly
helping actions, to the extent that they were willing
to endure pain themselves to lessen the pain of
others [43]. Nevertheless, this effect might be
weakened when an observer and a pain-taker are
in a competitive (compared with a cooperative)
context, as evidenced in one of our studies [4].
Whether the pain-taker could be considered as an
in-group (in contrast to an out-group) member

The proposed psychological mechanisms about how the perception of other’s pain affects social decisions.
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is also an issue [42, 43]. Similarly, when a participant’s erroneous responses during a cognitive
task result in the application of a painful stimulus
to his/her partner, he/she is prone to bearing
a proportion of pain for that partner as compensation due to feelings of guilt, especially if
he/she is solely responsible for the stimulation
[70]. Guilt, but not shame, can increase cooperation
among people who generally act uncooperatively
[108]. Overall, the aforementioned findings reveal
that a (real or hypothetical) painful experience
of another person could be a powerful factor
influencing social decision-making.
In the next section, we introduce background
information about the social framing effect, which
is an important topic in the field of decision
science. Manipulating others’ pain in experimental
designs has produced novel findings about this
effect in some of our recent experiments.

4

Social framing effect

4.1 Definition and classic literature
The framing effect occurs when logically equivalent
statements (i.e., the frame) about the same
decision problem lead people to choose different
options [109]. As a decision bias, the framing
effect violates the consistency (invariance) axiom
of normative rationality [110, 111]. The Asian
disease problem (ADP) is a famous example: in
a hypothetical situation where an uncommon
disease is expected to attack 600 people, participants’ attitudes toward a disease-combating
plan are strongly affected by how it is described;
they prefer the plan when its outcome is expressed
as “200 out of 600 persons will be saved” but avoid
the same plan when the outcome is expressed
as “400 out of 600 persons will die” [112]. The
predominant explanation of this phenomenon is
that positive or negative emotions elicited by the
frame are integrated into cognitive judgments and
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subsequently elicit an approach or avoidance
tendency, respectively. That is to say, ADP
participants switch away from the option associated
with 400 deaths because its description generates
negative emotions that bias decision-making
in a heuristic way. According to Kahneman and
Frederick, the framing effect represents a competition between “system 1” and “system 2” [113].
Findings from neuroimaging studies support this
viewpoint, as De Martino and colleagues found
that, in a gain/loss gambling framing task, the
amygdala (closely related with emotional processing) was activated when participants’ decisions
were consistent with the framing effect, while
the ACC (closely related with inhibition control)
was activated when decisions ran counter to the
framing effect [see also 114, 115, 116].
There are various ways to divide the framing
effect into subtypes [117, 118]. An emerging trend
is to distinguish the social from the nonsocial
framing effect [119–121]. This trend was partly
inspired by the understanding that the mechanisms
of social decision-making might be independent
from those of nonsocial decision-making to some
degree (see Section 3). However, the definition
of the social framing effect is largely unclear in the
literature. McDaniel and Sistrunk interpreted this
effect as “the framing effect for social decisionmaking” or “the impact of framing on social
dilemmas” [122, see also 123]. To be more specific,
we define the social framing effect as a phenomenon where varying the description of a social
dilemma (or social components in this dilemma)
changes individual preferences for different options
[124]. An effective social framing manipulation
focuses on highlighting conflicts between personal
interests and the interests of others [125]. This can
be done by emphasizing (a) internalized social
norms, (b) how others interpret one’s behavior,
or (c) the expectations of each other’s behavior
[126].
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According to the taxonomy recently proposed
by Dufwenberg, Gächter, and Hennig-Schmidt,
there are two major approaches to manipulate the
social framing effect [103]. The first approach is
“valence framing” which puts the same information in an emotionally positive or negative light.
For instance, participants might be endowed with
some resources and then asked to determine how
many resources they want to “give to” (positive
framing) or “take from” (negative framing) the
public good [120, 127, 128]. Researchers have
suggested that positive framing motivates participants to focus on actions that could result in
a positive externality for others; consequently,
the likelihood of making prosocial decisions is
expected to be higher under positive framing than
negative framing [103]. The second approach
is “label framing” which represents the game
situation with alternative labels. For instance,
the aforementioned resource dilemma might be
described as a “Wall Street Game” or “Community
Game” in the task instructions [119, 126, 129, 130].
The rationale is that the “Community Game” (or
“Teamwork Game”, “Social Exchange Game”)
connotes collective interests and cooperative social
norms, thus boosting prosocial decision-making
tendencies [119]. Unfortunately, both approaches
have yielded equivocal results across different
studies [131, 132]. Andreoni [127] and Park [128]
reported that the rate of resource contribution to
the public good was higher under the positive
compared with the negative framing conditions,
but Brewer and Kramer [133] found greater
contributions under the “take” (or “keep”,
“harvest”) compared with the “give” (or “leave”,
“contribute”) framing conditions [see also 123,
134, 135]. Meanwhile, the cooperation rate was
higher when the prisoner’s dilemma was labeled
as a “Community Game” in contrast to a “Wall
Street Game” in Liberman, Samuels, and Ross
[119], but the reverse was true in Brandts and
Schwieren [129]. Finally, there have been many

other studies that report weak or no social framing
effects [126, 136-138].
Many factors might have accounted for these
heterogeneous results [134]. To our knowledge,
most previous studies asked participants to make
decisions about economic benefits accruing
to themselves and to others [120, 125, 134, 136,
138–142]. Nevertheless, people generally care
about their own monetary outcomes far more
than those of others [107]. In this case, the influence
of social framing on behavioral tendencies might
be limited, especially for those who have a lower
level of social preference [125]. Intriguingly,
Crockett et al. recently designed a social dilemma
examining preferences relating to subjective cost
and physical pain: participants were asked if they
would give up an amount of money in exchange
for avoiding a painful electrical shock for themselves or for an anonymous other person [107].
Their results revealed that participants were
more likely to trade-off their profits against
the pain experienced by others rather than by
themselves, indicating a “hyperaltruistic” tendency.
(In contrast, a follow-up experiment indicated that
participants were unwilling to harm themselves
for others’ profit [143]). The findings from Crockett
et al. [107] reveal that another’s pain boosts
prosocial decisions more reliably compared
with another’s economic income, thus making it
practical to manipulate prosocial tendencies across
different framing conditions (i.e., to create a social
framing effect).
4.2 Our recent progress
Inspired by the study of Crockett et al. [107], we
recently developed a social decision task that took
others’ pain into account. Before the experimental
session, each participant was introduced to a
partner (confederate), who played the “victim”
that would be exposed to the risk of receiving an
electrical shock during the task. The probability
of one’s partner receiving this shock increased
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proportionally with individual preferences for
income maximization. The participant and his/her
partner sat in different rooms since the expression
of pain is unnecessary for eliciting social emotions
including empathy and guilt (see Section 2). In
each trial, the participant was shown a runway
on a computer screen, which represented two
possible outcomes on its left and right ends;
one outcome (a costly helping one) was that the
participant would lose 5 Chinese RMB from
his/her final payment, but the partner would
avoid the shock in this trial, and the reverse was
true for the other outcome. Each participant was
then asked to move an avatar on the runway to
indicate his/her relative preference for the two
possible outcomes. The resolution of the slider
was 10%, which means there were nine different
options (10%–90%) for the participant to choose.
Two framing conditions in our task described
the possible outcomes in different ways. In the
harm framing condition, it was implied that the
shock was delivered as a result of the participant’s

Fig. 2

own action (“harm the other person by administering a painful electric shock and keep all your
payment”); in the help framing condition, the
shock was described as a part of the task (“help
the other person to avoid a painful electric shock
and subtract 5 RMB from your own payment”).
In our opinion, participants should have experienced a stronger moral conflict with their social
responsibilities in the harm frame and therefore
would be more likely to choose the costly options
to help (Fig. 2A).
The behavioral results supported our hypothesis,
that is, participants made many more prosocial
decisions under the harm framing condition than
the help framing condition, leading to a significant
social framing effect (Fig. 2B). We also collected
fMRI data during the task and found that the
activation level of several brain regions increased
as a function of the social framing effect size
(parameter estimation). Among these regions,
the bilateral TPJ became the focus of our further
analyses due to its importance in the social brain

(A) Experimental design of our social framing task. The arrow above each frame indicates the direction of prosocial tendency

corresponding to the choice. (B) Behavioral data of our neuroimaging experiment as indicated by difference of average prosocial
tendency of all participants between harm and help frames. (C) Functional connectivity between the rTPJ and mPFC was underlying
the observed behavioral social framing effect (i.e., participants showed significantly higher prosocial tendency in harm frame than they
did in help frame). (D) Behavioral data of our tDCS experiment. Social framing effect was calculated as prosocial tendency
prosocial tendency harm frame − prosocial tendency help frame.
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network [144]. Permutation tests confirmed that
the rTPJ (but not its left counterpart) could
identify the trials in which participants’ decisions
were consistent with the social framing effect
(i.e., prosocial decisions under the harm framing
condition, but not under the help framing
condition) and the trials in which participants’
decisions ran counter to this effect. Moreover,
psychophysiological interaction analysis revealed
that the strength of the rTPJ–mPFC connection
predicted the social framing effect size (Fig. 2C),
possibly reflecting the impact of social emotions
on decision preferences at the neural level [124].
As brain-imaging techniques, including fMRI,
are constrained in making causal inferences [145],
we then conducted a second experiment using
transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to
examine whether the rTPJ plays a critical role in
the social framing effect (Fig. 2D). Participants
were asked to finish our social framing task as
well as the classic monetary framing task from De
Martino et al. [146] in two days. The sequence
of these two tasks was counterbalanced across
participants. The results showed that compared
with sham stimulation, the social framing effect
size increased under anodal (excitatory) stimulation
but decreased under cathodal (inhibitory)
stimulation of the rTPJ; in contrast, the nonsocial
(monetary) framing effect was insensitive to
tDCS manipulation [124].
We further explored whether the social framing
effect was sensitive to social context, given that
empathy for pain is highly context-dependent
and that the neural response to others’ pain can
be modulated by contextual factors [11, 147, 148].
Specifically, we used an impression-forming
procedure from the study by Singer et al. [45]
to manipulate each participant’s impression of
his/her partner. Prior to the social framing task,
each participant and two partners (confederates)
played a one-round Dictator Game together, in
which the partners acted as dictators to individually

allocate 10 RMB between themselves and the real
participant. One partner behaved fairly (evenly
allocating the money), but the other one behaved
unfairly. Then the real participant was asked to
finish the social framing task with his/her partners
playing the “victims” in different trials. We found
an effect of impression forming on participants’
general attitudes, that is, participants were more
likely to help a “fair” victim compared with an
“unfair victim” at a cost to themselves. However,
the social framing effect size (i.e., the behavioral
difference between two framing conditions) was
generally unaffected. These results are consistent
with previous findings that empathic responses
were reduced when participants viewed expressions
of pain on an unfair person compared with a fair
person [45].
In our opinion, the decision to “harm” others
is more morally reprehensible than “not to help”
others, which triggers a stronger conflict between
moral values and material concerns [124]. Stronger
empathic emotions and/or feelings of guilt are
elicited accordingly, which are the main driving
forces of the social framing effect observed in our
studies. It should be noted that these emotions
were anticipatory in our experiments, as the
participants did not actually observe others in
pain. In accordance with this finding, previous
research has shown that the rTPJ is responsible
for representing moral conflicts [149, 150].
Nevertheless, we did not employ explicit measures
of emotional feelings in these experiments. In one
of our most recent studies, we asked participants
to fill the Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective
Empathy [151] and found that individual levels
of the cognitive empathy trait do play a prominent role in the trade-off of painful experiences
between oneself and others.

5

Summary and future directions

Researchers in the field of pain science are
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generally more interested in emotional feelings
elicited by painful experiences at first-hand,
including frustration, worry, anxiety, and depression [152, 153]. In contrast, this paper focuses
on emotional feelings (particularly empathy and
guilt) elicited by the observation of pain in other
people. The influence of these emotions on social
behavior and social decisions is discussed. Overall,
previous findings have shown that empathy and
guilt form a bridge between concerns for other
people’s pain and prosocial behavior (e.g., costly
helping). The relationship between pain observation, emotion, and morality can assist in
understanding the social nature of human beings
and is of scientific value for researchers and
clinicians to investigate. Also, others’ pain could
be used to manipulate the emotional feelings of
participants in psychological research. By asking
participants to make a trade-off between economic
benefits and another’s experience, our recent
studies have provided insight into the neural
mechanisms of the social framing effect. The role
of the rTPJ has been highlighted in these studies,
which is not surprising given its importance in
socio-emotional processing and moral judgment.
More generally, our findings support the opinion
that neural correlates of social and nonsocial
decision-making are dissociated, given that the
rTPJ is not recognized as a key region for the
nonsocial framing effect [115, 146].
When taking individual differences into account,
the implications of our findings for clinical science
are worth noting. For example, it is well known
that people with autism spectrum disorders are
insensitive to the pain of others [154, 155]. Thus,
it would be practically meaningful to examine
whether this insensitivity is evident at the
behavioral level (e.g., a smaller social framing
effect size). From this perspective, our social
framing paradigm has the potential to assist in
the clinical observation of mental disorders. In
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addition, regarding the impact of emotion on
decision-making (see Section 3), an unsolved
problem is whether empathy and guilt elicited by
pain in others modulate decision-making directly
(as suggested by the risk-as-feeling hypothesis)
or through cognitive evaluation (as suggested
by the affect-as-information hypothesis). Finally,
our findings indicate a close relationship between
reward processing and pain processing, which
has been acknowledged recently and needs to be
explored further [156, 157].
Because of space limitations, this paper is mostly
devoted to social emotions resulting from others’
pain. Put inversely, pain could be utilized as a tool
to alleviate these emotions. When participants
were reminded of an incident of unethical
behavior, they tended to undergo physical pain
(e.g., holding hands in ice water) and rated that
experience as more painful [158]. In this case,
the pain might serve as a self-punishment or be
construed as cleansing to reduce the feelings of
guilt [159]. Further, experiencing physical pain
facilitates self-reward with guilty pleasures [160].
These phenomena indicate that beyond the scope
of our review, there are still numerous issues to
be explored regarding the dynamics between
pain, emotion, and social behavior.
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